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In Re: National Collegiate Athletic Association 
Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation: 
Opening the Door For Student-Athletes To Receive 
Adequate Compensation For Their Services To The 





In In Re: National Collegiate Athletic Association Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap 
Antitrust Litigation,1 the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California 
addressed whether the current National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) 
rules, which limit the compensation football and basketball student-athletes in 
Division I athletics receive in exchange for their athletic services, violate federal 
antitrust law.2 These challenged NCAA rules were believed to be violating federal 
antitrust law by limiting compensation student-athletes would receive in exchange 
for their services in the absence of these limits.3 The challenged NCAA rules at issue 
in this case were: 1) limiting the athletics-based grants-in-aid at the cost of 
attendance; 2) regulating compensation that relates to education, and 3) regulating 
compensation incidental to athletics participation and unrelated to education.4 After 
applying the Rule-of-Reason analysis5 to the NCAA’s compensation limits, the 
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1. 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 1058. 
 4. Id. at 1066. 
 5. The Rule-of-Reason Analysis analyzes to a restraint’s harm to competition and procompetitive effects. 
If the restraint’s harm to competition outweighs its procompetitive effects than the restraint violates the Rule-of-
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Court held that the challenged rules unreasonably restrained trade in violation of 
Section One of the Sherman Act.6 As such, the Court correctly held that the NCAA’s 
rules in their current form violated Section One of the Sherman Act7 by creating 
limits that are set by the NCAA’s monopsony power over student-athletes who wish 
to compete in the high revenue raising industry of Division I college athletics, 
without another market to turn to.8 However, this holding will only remain correct as 
long as there is continual enforcement of the distinction between college and 
professional sports in that students-athletes remain students in pursuit of education.9 
Under the less restrictive rules proposed by current and former collegiate football 
and basketball players bringing action in this case, the distinction between amateur 
student-athletes and professional athletes should pursue to take place in the NCAA 
since the alternative new rules accepted by the courts only expand education-related 
compensation benefits student-athletes receive.10 Therefore, student-athletes will 
still only be receiving compensation in connection with their pursuit of an 
education.11  
Student-athletes in Division I college sports deserve to be compensated more than 
the modest benefits the current NCAA rules allow them to receive.12 The NCAA 
should increase education based compensation to student-athletes that keep this 
revenue-producing industry of college athletics growing.13 The current rules do not 
allow for this due to the NCAA’s horizontal price fixing, and therefore the Court 
held correctly that they should be changed as to no longer violate Section One of the 
Sherman Act.14  
I. THE CASE 
The plaintiffs of this case are current and former student-athletes, comprised of 
individuals who played either Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) Football 
or men’s and women’s Division I Basketball between March 5, 2014 and the 
 
Reason, which then violates Section One of the Sherman Act. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n 
7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 6. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 
1109. See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2004). 
 7. Id. 
 8. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 
1066. 
 9. Id. at 1101. 
 10. Id. at 1105-06. 
 11. Id. at 1101. 
 12. Id. at 1110. 
 13. Id. at 1074. 
 14. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2004). 
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present.15 The Court granted the motion for Rule 23(b)(2) Class Certification, making 
the relief class for this action inclusive of student-athletes who would be offered, or 
have already received, a full grant-in-aid.16 The defendants of this case are the NCAA 
and eleven of its conferences17 that compete in FBS Football and Division I 
Basketball.18 
The plaintiffs, the student-athletes themselves, first commenced these actions in 
2014 and 2015, attacking the NCAA’s cap on their grant-in-aid directly.19 The 
defendants argued that this attack should be ruled on summary judgment based on 
the decisions of the Ninth Circuit.20 The defendants point out the United States Court 
of Appeals, Ninth Circuit decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (O’Bannon II)21, which would hold the plaintiffs’ complaint in this 
current action invalid if the plaintiffs were found in privity with the parties in 
O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (O’Bannon II).22 However, the 
Court ruled that the plaintiffs in this current action were not part of the class of 
plaintiffs in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (O’Bannon II) 23. 
Therefore, it was not enough that both suits had essentially the same cause of action 
against the NCAA. The Court held that the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment was not appropriate because the plaintiffs in In Re: National Collegiate 
Athletic Association Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation24 had raised new 
antitrust challenges to the NCAA conduct at a new time period, requiring a new Rule-
of-Reason analysis under antitrust law.25 
 
 15. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1065. 
 16. Id. at 1065. 
 17. Conference Defendants: Pac-12 Conference (Pac-12), The Big Ten Conference, Inc. (Big Ten), The Big 
12 Conference, Inc. (Big 12), Southeastern Conference (SEC), and The Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) 
(collectively, the Power Five Conferences); American Athletic Conference (AAC), Conference USA, Inc., Mid-
American Conference (MAC), Mountain West Conference, Sun Belt Conference, and Western Athletic 
Conference (WAC). See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. 375 F. 
Supp. 3d 1058, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 18. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1061-
62 
 19. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., Nos. 14-md-02541-CW, 
14-cv-02758-CW, 2018 WL 1524005, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2018). 
 20. The Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals held that allowing NCAA member schools to 
award grant-in-aid up to their full cost of attendance would be a less restrictive alternative, therefore not violating 
antitrust laws. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 802 F.3d 1049, 1074-76 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 21. 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 22. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 2018 WL 1524005, at 
*5. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Nos. 14-md-02541-CW, 14-cv-02758-CW, 2018 WL 1524005 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2018). 
 25. Id. at *7-8.  
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The NCAA conduct being challenged in In Re: National Collegiate Athletic 
Association Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation26 was the NCAA’s 
interconnected rules that limit the compensation student-athletes may receive for 
their services.27 The plaintiffs strive to  portray that the rules violate federal antitrust 
law as they restrain trade in the relevant market, affect interstate commerce, and 
produce anticompetitive effects.28 The challenged rules include the NCAA’s 
regulation of compensation that is related to education and the NCAA’s regulation 
of compensation incidental to athletics participation but unrelated to education.29 
Although horizontal price-fixing among competitors is usually in direct violation of 
federal antitrust laws, the Court decided that there is a need for some regulation and 
cooperation to market athletics competition.30 Therefore, the Rule-of-Reason 
analysis would be done by the Court during a bench trial to determine what 
regulations those shall be.31 
During the cross motions for summary judgment, the Court decided the market 
definition from O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (O’Bannon 
I)32, would apply for the Rule-of-Reason analysis.33 This market definition looked to 
schools as buyers and student-athletes as sellers, with the plaintiffs’ antitrust claims 
being analyzed as a monopsony.34  
After the United States District Court for the Northern District of California ruled 
on the defendants’ and plaintiffs’ cross motions, the Court then scheduled a pretrial 
conference, followed by a bench trial, to determine if the NCAA rules limiting 
compensation to the student-athletes in Division I sports in the NCAA produced 
sufficient anticompetitive effects that unreasonably restrained trade, violating 
Section One of the Sherman Act35.36 
 
 26. 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 27. Id. at 1062. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1066. The challenged rules are the NCAA’s student athlete compensation-cap rules imposing a 
limit on the cost of attendance for the compensation student-athletes can receive. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 33. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 
(N.D. Cal. 2019). In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., Nos. 14-md-
02541-CW, 14-cv-02758-CW, 2018 WL 1524005, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2018). 
 34. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 986, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 35. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2004). 
 36. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 2018 WL 1524005, at 
*14-15. 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND  
The Sherman Act37 requires a plaintiff to show three things in order to establish a 
claim of a violation of antitrust law: (1) there was contract, combination, or 
conspiracy; (2) agreement unreasonably restrained trade under either per se rule of 
illegality or rule of reason analysis; and (3) restraint affected interstate commerce. 
The Courts have applied a Rule-of-Reason analysis when determining if the NCAA 
has violated antitrust law in their respected market and industry.38 
A. The Court has usually condemned horizontal agreements among competitors to 
fix the price for an industry’s good or service as unlawful per se.  
In 1927, the Supreme Court held a violation of the Sherman Antitrust law could 
be proven by horizontal agreements among competitors.39 The Court stated that the 
power to fix prices was the power to fix unreasonable prices, and therefore 
agreements among competitors to fix a price or service in a market are usually 
deemed per se unlawful.40 The Supreme Court defended this per se approach to the 
act of horizontal price fixing because the aim of every price fixing agreement 
between competitors was to eliminate one form of competition, which in effect 
would directly affect interstate commerce, violating the Sherman Act.41  
 The Supreme Court reiterated this analysis on horizontal price fixing in its 
decision in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. in 1979.42 
The Supreme Court held that the probability that the practices of horizontal price 
fixing being anti-competitive are so high that it is determined to be as a matter of law 
illegal per se.43 Therefore, horizontal price fixing among competitors in an industry 
may be evidence of actors restricting competition, and consequently could be a 
violation of the Sherman Act.44  
 
 37. Sherman Act § 1. OR 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2004). 
 38. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (applying 
the rule of reason analysis to an antitrust suit challenging a college athletic association’s plan for televising 
college football games). 
 39. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396 (1927) (“The law is clear that an agreement 
on the part of the members of a combination controlling a substantial part of an industry, upon the prices which 
the members are to charge for their commodity, is in itself an undue and unreasonable restraint of trade and 
commerce.”) 
 40. Id. at 379. 
 41. Id. at 379. 
 42. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 43. Id. at 19. 
 44. Id. 
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B. The Supreme Court has determined that horizontal price fixing in the NCAA’s 
respected market is not an action per se of illegality under the Sherman Act, and 
therefore a Rule-of-Reason analysis must be applied. 
In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University 
of Oklahoma45, the Supreme Court found that it would be inappropriate to apply a 
per se rule of illegality to the NCAA’s rules because the horizontal restraints on 
competition are an important element to the functionality of the industry of collegiate 
sports. However, emphasized in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association46 (O’Bannon II), it was not that the NCAA rules were presumptively 
valid as a matter of law, rather the rules should be analyzed under a Rule-of-Reason 
analysis.47 The Rule-of-Reason analysis became the test of the NCAA’s rules 
because collegiate sports could not exist without some horizontal agreements, 
therefore horizontal price fixing agreements cannot automatically be determined to 
be illegal under the Section One of the Sherman Act48 for the industry of collegiate 
sports.49  
The industry of collegiate sports is an industry that can only be carried out jointly 
because what the NCAA and member institutions market to its customers is 
competition itself.50 In order for competition between the institutions to be carried 
out and the product of amateur sports to be preserved, there must be rules jointly 
agreed upon by all institutions who are a part of the competition.51 It is these mutual 
agreements the NCAA imposes on its member institutions that in turn have a 
procompetitive affect by protecting the product of amateur competition.52 Therefore, 
the NCAA’s horizontal price fixing agreements cannot automatically be determined 
to be illegal under Section One of the Sherman Act and a Rule-of-Reason analysis.53   
The Rule-of-Reason analysis, like the per se of illegality standard, is designed to 
see if a NCAA rule has an impact on competition.54 If the rule has an anti-competitive 
impact, then the restraint affects interstate commerce, and therefore is not valid under 
 
 45. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). Id. at 86. 
 46. 802 F.3d 1049. 
 47. Id. at 1063. 
 48. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2004). 
 49. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99-101 (1984) 
(finding it inappropriate to hold the NCAA’s horizontal agreements unreasonable as a matter of law because the 
NCAA is an industry which horizontal restraints on competition are necessary.). 
 50. Id. at 101. 
 51. Id. at 101. 
 52. Id. at 101-102. 
 53. Id. at 99-101. 
 54. Id. at 103. 
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Section One of the Sherman Act.55 However, if the rule is pro-competitive the Court 
must also determine whether the rule is more restrictive than necessary.56  
If the rule is too restrictive, then an alternative one will replace it to be valid under 
Section One of the Sherman Act.57 However, the Court has also determined that the 
alternate less restrictive rule must be “virtually as effective”58 in serving the purpose 
and tradition of the NCAA’s industry, as well as “without significantly increased 
cost”.59 
C. Collegiate sports under the NCAA are considered a distinct market with its own 
character and product.  
The Supreme Court determined that the NCAA rules are meant to preserve a 
character and product that is entirely unique to the industry itself.60 In O’Bannon v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Association61 (O’Bannon I) the Court held that the 
qualitative differences between the opportunities in divisions of the NCAA, such as 
FBS Football and Division 1 Basketball, demonstrate that collegiate sports under 
NCAA rules is a distinct market itself.62 This was upheld as the standard in O’Bannon 
II.63 This distinct market created one that the Court found to be a type of interstate 
commerce which needed to be in compliance with the antitrust laws.64 This market 
is made up of student-athletes as the sellers and collegiate institutions as the buyers, 
requiring the exchange between schools and student-athlete recruits to not be one 
that is anti-competitive.65 
D. The NCAA rules serve the purpose of preserving the character and product of 
collegiate sports by keeping the amateur status of student-athletes. 
The Supreme Court in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of 
Regents of the University of Oklahoma determined that in order to uphold the 
character and quality of the NCAA, student-athletes must be required to be students 
in pursuit of higher education.66 A key aspect of the character and product of the 
 
 55. Id. at 104. See Sherman Act § 1. OR 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2004). 
 56. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079. 
 57. Id. at 1075. 
 58. Cty. of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 59. Id. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1074. 
 60. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984). 
 61. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 62. Id. at 987. 
 63.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056-1057. 
 64. Id. at 1070. 
 65. Id. at 1070. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 991. 
 66. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 119 (1984). 
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NCAA, is the amateurism aspect of the student-athletes competing in the market.67 
The NCAA’s goal to preserve this character in the market they have created comes 
with a motivation to appeal to consumers partaking in the markets and to attract 
students who want to earn a higher education while competing in their sport; an 
attraction that comes with collegiate athletics rather than professional sports.68  
The NCAA rules, though wanting to preserve the character of amateurism of 
collegiate sports, have been determined by the Court to mean that student athletes 
are still allowed to receive compensation in addition to athletic scholarships.69 
However, the Court has been careful to say that the NCAA’s compensation rules 
should continue to have two pro-competitive purposes to preserve the character in 
the market the NCAA has created.70 These purposes include the continuance of 
combining academics with athletics and preserving an understanding of amateurism 
that the character and product of the NCAA is centered around.71 
Though the NCAA is given much deference in its market to the construction of 
its rules, the Supreme Court has deemed that it does not make such rules 
presumptively lawful under antitrust law.72 The NCAA rules that restrict the market 
to preserve the character of collegiate athletics are lawful, but not every rule is 
determined to do so.73 Therefore, a Rule-of-Reason analysis is needed to determine 
where NCAA rules fall in illegality under section one of the Sherman Act.74  
The Rule-of-Reason analysis is conducted when there is a claim that a NCAA rule 
violates antitrust law, however the Rule-of-Reason analysis only requires that the 
NCAA provide a student athlete compensation in the amount of his or her cost of 
attendance.75 According to the NCAA’s own rules, a student athlete remains an 
amateur if the compensation they receive goes to cover educational expenses, 
allowing compensation of student athletes to still continue the character of the NCAA 
itself.76 However, the Court went on to say in O’Bannon II77 that the difference 
between offering student athletes compensation for educational reasons is far 
different than compensation unrelated to educational expenses.78 This set the Court’s 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 986. 
 69. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 104. See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, 
is declared to be illegal.”). 
 75. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079. 
 76. Id. at 1075. 
 77. 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 78. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1078. 
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precedent for viewing NCAA’s grant of compensation into a binary concept of 
compensation for educational and non-educational reasons, in order to keep the 
character of amateurism in the NCAA consistent.  
III. THE COURT’S REASONING  
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of California was presented 
with the task to decide if the NCAA violated federal antitrust law by limiting the 
compensation student-athletes could receive in exchange for their athletic services in 
In Re: National Collegiate Athletic Association Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust 
Litigation.79 After the bench trial, Justice Claudia Wilken held that the current NCAA 
rules that limited non-cash education related benefits on top of grant-in-aid had 
anticompetitive effects and unreasonably retrained trade, violating Section One of 
the Sherman Act.80 
The Court found that the restriction of non-cash education related benefits was 
not necessary to preserve the consumer demand for college athletics as a distinct 
entity from professional sports.81 The Court used the Rule-of-Reason analysis to 
determine the competitive significance of the NCAA rules that limited compensation 
student-athletes could receive.82 Under the Rule-of-Reason analysis, the Court 
analyzed the anticompetitive effects of the current rules and whether the plaintiffs 
were able to demonstrate less restrictive viable alternative rules to them. In doing so, 
the Court found that that the NCAA has monopsony power over the market of college 
athletics, and that the challenged rules suppress competition and fix the price of 
student-athletes’ services, creating an abundant amount of anticompetitive effects.83 
The Court then held that the NCAA was unable to show that the challenged rules’ 
purpose was to bring about any pro-competitive effects because the rules neither 
promoted amateurism, enhancing consumer demand for college athletics; nor 
promoted integration of student-athletes with their academic communities, 
improving the quality of the education the student-athletes received.84 The NCAA 
was unable to point to any bylaw that defined amateurism, and already some of the 
permissible compensation student-athletes received that was related to education was 
above the cost of attendance.85 The NCAA presented no explanation for why limits 
 
 79. 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 80. Id. See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal.”). 
 81. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 
1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 82. Id. at 1096. 
 83. Id. at 1097. 
 84. Id. at 1098. 
 85. Id. at 1099. 
Cardinale (DO NOT DELETE) 8/3/2021  8:34 PM 
In Re: NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation 
10 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
on education-related benefits are necessary to preserve consumer demand of college 
athletics, with witness testimony confirming that no study of consumer demand had 
ever been considered when the NCAA made rules about compensation.86  
Furthermore, the Court held that the NCAA’s evidence of the rules promoting 
integration and improving student-athletes’ education was weak, with compensation 
increasing for student-athletes since 2015 and no separation between student-athletes 
and other students resulting from it.87 It was determined that divides amongst 
students a inevitable and unrelated to the challenged rules of compensation for 
student-athletes.88 
The Court held that the alternative rules, allowing the NCAA to continue to limit 
compensation that is unrelated to education and no longer allowing it to restrict non-
cash education related benefits provided on top of grant-in-aid, were as effective as 
the challenged rules and did not require increased cost to achieve its 
implementation.89 Therefore, the alternative rules would continue consumer demand 
for college athletics by preserving the amateurism of the sports by having the 
compensation continue to go towards legitimate education related benefits.90 The 
Court reasoned that it came to its conclusion separate from O’Bannon II91 because 
O’Bannon II was not meant to be read so broadly as to forbid any Rule-of-Reason 
challenge to any NCCA rule that restricts or prohibits student-athlete 
compensation.92 Therefore, every challenged NCAA rule’s validity under the Rule-
of-Reason analysis must be proved, not presumed.93 
IV. ANALYSIS  
In In Re: National Collegiate Athletic Association Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap 
Antitrust Litigation94 the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California 
held that the NCAA’s rules limiting non-cash education related compensation to 
student-athletes, in exchange for their athletic services, resulted in anti-competitive 
effects in the specified market and therefore was in violation of Section One of the 
 
 86. Id. at 1101. 
 87. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 
1103 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1104. 
 90. Id. at 1105. 
 91. 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 92. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 
1106. 
 93. Id. at 1106. 
 94. 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
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Sherman Act.95 However, the District Court also held that the NCAA could continue 
to limit compensation, paid in addition to the cost of attendance, that is unrelated to 
education.96 This case created a binary of compensation for student-athletes in an 
attempt to put an end to anticompetitive effects of the NCAA’s monopsony power 
while still preserving the procompetitive effect of amateurism the NCAA relies on.97 
This binary concept created is key to preserving amateurism of the student-athletes, 
a factor that is key to the specific market college athletics is versus its professional 
sports counterpart.98  
The Court correctly applied the Rule-of-Reason analysis instead of the per se rule 
of illegality when determining if the NCAA’s horizontal price fixing in its market 
was in violation of Section One of the Sherman Act99 because the NCAA has always 
been in its own specified market, requiring horizontal restraints to keep up consumer 
demand of collegiate athletics.100 By applying the Rule-of-Reason analysis, the 
NCAA is given notice that just because they are in a specific market, does not mean 
they are able to get away with rules that have an anticompetitive impact or rules that 
are too restrictive in their means to preserve the pro-competitive effects of collegiate 
athletics.101   
A. Limiting compensation related to education of student-athletes to be at the 
maximum of grant-in-aid is not required to preserve the amateur status of student-
athletes.  
The amateur status of student-athletes is a major part of the consumer demand of 
the collegiate athletics.102 However, the definition of amateurism that is offered by 
the defendants as not “pay to play” in In Re: National Collegiate Athletic Association 
Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation is not one that is specified in the 
NCAA Division 1 Manual.103 Furthermore, student-athletes under the rules of the 
NCAA are compensated with various forms of payment, these various forms found 
 
 95. Id. at 1058. See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (“Every contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is declared to be illegal.”). 
 96. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 
1104. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1103-1104. 
 99. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). 
 100. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 85 (1984). 
 101. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 984-85 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (explaining 
that NCAA would have the burden of bringing forth evidence of the restraint’s procompetitive efforts). 
 102. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 
1070. 
 103. Id. at 1071. 
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and allowed in the NCAA bylaws as “not pay”.104 By the NCAA bylaws listing 
different forms of compensation that would be considered as “pay” and providing 
exceptions to that list, it leads to the conclusion that amateurism does not simply 
mean the disallowance of compensation.105 
The statement the defendants had made in In Re: National Collegiate Athletic 
Association Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, that preserving the 
amateurism aspect of collegiate athletics was an important pro-competitive effect of 
the market created by the NCAA to continue consumer demand, was not an 
erroneous statement.106 The Supreme Court had ruled on the character and quality of 
the NCAA being one that stemmed from the amateurism of the players, 
differentiating it from professional sports.107 However, another part of the attraction 
of amateurism for collegiate athletics is that student-athletes are pursuing a higher 
education in return for their athletic services.108 This aspect of amateurism logically 
concludes that there should be different limits for compensation related to education 
and compensation unrelated to education, a concept the court found In Re: National 
Collegiate Athletic Association Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation.109 
 The NCAA rules in effect before this case had anti-competitive effects as they 
constituted as horizontal price fixing enacted with the NCAA’s monopsony power, 
which harmed student-athletes by depriving them of compensation for their service 
they would have otherwise received for their athletic services.110 The NCAA rules as 
they stood before horizontally price fixed by putting a cap on athletics-based grant-
in-aid at the cost of attendance and limiting the noncash education related 
compensation of student-athletes.111 The new alternative rules In Re: National 
Collegiate Athletic Association Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation will 
keep the distinction between student and professional athletes while also allowing 
price competition to exist as a key aspect of recruiting student-athletes in NCAA 
Division I sports, therefore no longer violating Section One of the Sherman Act112 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1071-1075. 
 106. Id. at 1070. 
 107. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984). 
 108. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 802 F.3d 1049, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 109. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 
1103-1104 (describing procompetitive effects of the compensation scheme as including limits on compensation 
and benefits unrelated to education and limits on cash or cash-equivalent educationed-related awards and 
incentives for academic achievement or graduation). 
 110. Id. at 1109. 
 111. Id. at 1066. 
 112. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2004). 
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by doing away with the NCAA’s horizontal price fixing under its monopsony 
power.113  
The NCAA rules in effect before this case were ones that had anticompetitive 
effects and too restrictively furthered the procompetitive justification of preserving 
amateurism in collegiate athletics.114 By limiting the noncash education related 
compensation of student-athletes, the NCAA was creating an unnecessary structure 
of horizontal price-fixing that did not impact the amateur status of student-athletes 
since this type of compensation received by student- athletes was for pursuit of their 
higher education, the very aspect that attracted consumer demand in the first place.115 
Therefore, the alternative rules adopted were not considered to effect the amateurism 
of student-athletes, preserving the very aspect of collegiate athletics that resulted in 
higher consumer demand.116  
B. The Rule of Reason Analysis is an important function of section one of the 
Sherman Act to prevent the NCAA from having unnecessary monopsony power in a 
market that calls for some horizontal restraints of competition to further the very 
industry of collegiate sports itself.  
The Supreme Court correctly had held that Division 1 collegiate athletics 
controlled by the NCAA is in itself a type of interstate commerce.117 Though 
collegiate athletics is its own type of market with a certain need for a degree of 
monopsony power to keep the integrity of the industry itself, the Court still found 
that the market of collegiate athletics needs to be kept compliant with antitrust 
laws.118 By turning to the Rule-of-Reason analysis for NCAA rules, the NCAA was 
not able to make rules that were presumptively valid as a matter of law, but instead 
had to prove that it neither had an anticompetitive impact nor was more restrictive 
than necessary to satisfy its procompetitive justifications.119 This analysis allows for 
the NCAA’s rules and regulations to stay in check of antitrust laws, investigating the 
impact of competition, while still allowing the functionality of the market of 
collegiate athletics to continue.120 
 
 113. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 
1109. 
 114. Id. at 1097-98. 
 115. Id. at 1099-1100. 
 116. Id. at 1099-1100. 
 117. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 
1109. 
 118. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 802 F.3d 1049, 1070 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that the 
NCAA compensation rules have a significant anticompetitive effect on college education market because it fixes 
an aspect of the price that recruits pay to attend school). 
 119. Id. at 1079. 
 120. Id. 
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A major component of the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications is 
amateurism.121 The horizontal restraints on competition are an important function of 
the NCAA rules and regulations in terms of compensation to keep student-athletes 
and universities in Division I collegiate athletics from participating in types of 
agreements that would inevitably result in student-athletes accepting money beyond 
an amateur status.122 However, Division I collegiate athletics are a market made up 
of interstate commerce, so it is important to ensure that anti-competitive effects do 
not occur.123 This is why the Rule-of-Reason analysis the court applied in In Re: 
National Collegiate Athletic Association Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust 
Litigation124 resulted in a balancing act of preserving amateurism of collegiate 
athletics, while also creating rules that allow student-athletes to be compensated 
adequately for the services they provide to such a huge industry created by the 
NCAA.  
V. CONCLUSION  
In In Re: National Collegiate Athletic Association Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap 
Antitrust Litigation125, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of 
California held that the restriction of noncash education related compensation on top 
of grant-in-aid was in violation of Section One of the Sherman Act.126 The Court 
correctly held that amateurism in an important aspect of the consumer demand of 
collegiate athletics, and should be preserved as a pro-competitive justifications to 
keep the integrity and functionality of the industry.127 However, the key to 
amateurism is not that student-athletes are forbidden from receiving compensation, 
but instead that the compensation received was in furtherance of the pursuit of higher 
education.128 The noncash education related compensation the NCAA’s rules limited, 
prior to the outcome of this case, clearly were not necessary to keep the pro-
competitive justification of amateurism continued in collegiate athletics.129 After 
applying the Rule-of-Reason analysis, it was clear to the Court that such a restriction 
was in violation of Section One of the Sherman Act130 and that the alternative rules 
 
 121. See supra Part IV Section A. 
 122. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 85 (1984). 
 123. Id. 
 124. 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 125. Id. at 1058. 
 126. Id. See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal.”). 
 127. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 987 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 128. Id. at 986. 
 129. See supra Part IV. 
 130. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). 
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to no longer allow such restriction was necessary for the market of NCAA to fall 
within compliance of antitrust laws.131  
 
 
 131. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 
1058, 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019). (“Restricting non-cash education-related benefits and academic awards that can be 
provided on top of a grant-in-aid has not been proven to be necessary to preserving consumer demand for Division 
I basketball and FBS football as a product distinct from professional sports”) 
